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NOTE
Liberty from Transfer Trauma: A
Fundamental Life and Liberty
Interestt
By Colette Z Hughes*
"I could tell you a lot; there is so much that is happening.
We are being treated as if we were in Nazi Germany or Russia.
"The food is slop; the residents are pushed, prodded and
mishandled. We are told nothing. Then we are told this place is
closing and we must move. Then once again we are told nothing.
What are we to think?
"I want to stay here-I won't leave. Where would I go? As
bad as it is, the others are no better. I would again be separated
from my friends; they would ship us out of here like freight."l
Introduction
Transfer trauma is the medically accepted term of art used to de-
scribe the dangerous effects of involuntary relocation on nursing home
patients.2 The basic principle of this phenomenon, as the federal dis-
t This note is respectfully dedicated to the Honorable Stanley A. Weigel, Judge of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
* Licensed Vocational Nurse; B.A., 1979, San Francisco State University;, member,
third year class.
1. Statement of Guy Bracco, former resident, San Franciscan Convalescent Center
["Post Street"] (Feb. 20, 1978) (emphasis added) (written in support of motion for prelimi-
nary injunction to halt relocation in Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Cal. 1978))
Mr. Bracco was one of the elderly leaders who unsuccessfully fought the closing of the facil-
ity and the relocation of more than 300 of San Francisco's elderly Medicaid poor. He was
transferred from the facility in June, 1978 to a nursing home miles away. Mr. Bracco died
three months later.
For a history of the Post Street residents' struggle to stop their involuntary transfer, see
Oddone, Post Street Post-MAorem Old.But Not Forgotten, NEW WEST, Oct. 22, 1979, at 23-
29. See also Oddone, Post Street Post Morten" Scenario of a Nursing Home Crisis, GRAY
PANTHER NETWORK, May/June 1980, at 7; Stix, Elderly Patients in Fightfor Ri'hts, L.A.
Times, Apr. 20, 1978, § IV, at 1, col. 1.
2. The phenomenon is also known as "transplantation shock" or "relocation effect."
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trict court noted in Bracco v. Lackner,3 "is the recognition that the
transfer of geriatric patients to any unfamiliar surroundings produces
an increased rate of morbidity and mortality."4
The deleterious effects of transfer trauma resulting in physical and
emotional deterioration have been recognized by the federal courts
since 1974.' In O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center,6 however, the
United States Supreme Court found no constitutionally cognizable in-
terest in freedom from transfer trauma:
This case does not involve the withdrawal of direct benefits.
Rather, it involves the Government's attempt to confer an indi-
rect benefit on Medicaid patients by imposing and enforcing min-
imum standards of care on facilities like Town Court. When
enforcement of those standards requires decertification of a facil-
ity, there may be an immediate, adverse impact on some resi-
dents. But surely that impact, which is an indirect and incidental
result of the Government's enforcement action, does not amount
to a deprivation of any interest in life, liberty or property."'
In O'Bannon, as in most other relevant cases in which the transfer
trauma issue has arisen, the Court was faced with a common factual
dilemma. At the heart of the dispute was the program known as Medi-
caid.8 The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) had
revoked the authority of a nursing home to provide its elderly residents
See generally Pastalan, Environmental Displacement: 4 Literature Reflecting Old Person-En-
vironment Transactions, in AGING AND MILIEU: ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON
GROWING OLD (G. Rawles & R. Ohta eds. to be published 1982). Pastalan's chapter is
derived from L. Pastalan, Relocation: A State of the Art (Nov. 1979) (unpublished paper
available through the Institute of Gerontology, University of Michigan) [hereinafter cited as
L. Pastalan, Relocation]. Dr. Leon Pastalan is Director of Research at the Institute of Ger-
ontology, University of Michigan and Co-Project Director of the National Institute for
Mental Health Investigation's Study of Involuntary Change of Patients from One Socio-
Physical Environment to Another. He organized the Pennsylvania Preparation for Reloca-
tion Project, which includes a longitudinal study of transfer trauma and its effects. This
project is in its ninth year of assisting the Pennsylvania Welfare Department in the develop-
ment and utilization of a plan for preparation of elderly residents for relocation from one
nursing home to another. The Pennsylvania relocation program has already been adopted,
in whole or in part, in Rhode Island, New Jersey, New York, Florida, and Michigan.
3. 462 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
4. Id. at 445.
5. See, e.g., Hathaway v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1976); Klein v. Ma-
thews, 430 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (D.N.J. 1977); Burchette v. Dumpson, 387 F. Supp. 812, 819
(E.D.N.Y. 1974).
6. 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
7. Id. at 787.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a (1976). The purpose of the program is to enable each state
to furnish medical assistance to aged and disabled persons whose income and resources are
not sufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.
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with medical care at government expense pursuant to Medicaid pro-
vider agreements.9
In response to the revocation, the nursing home and several of its
residents brought suit for injunctive relief, alleging that the residents
were entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the revocation
before Medicaid payments were discontinued.10
The residents' argument in support of their interest was based pri-
madly upon the "entitlement theory" of due process which blossomed
in the early 1970's. 11 Relying on a series of cases beginning with
Goldberg v. Kelly,' 2 the residents asserted a constitutionally protected
property interest in continued occupancy of the facility under various
Medicaid provisions. Not surprisingly, the Court rejected the alleged
entitlements. 13
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens, held
that elderly Medicaid beneficiaries have no interest in receiving bene-
fits for care in a particular facility that entitles them, as a matter of
constitutional law, to a hearing before HEW and the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Public Welfare (DPW)14 can decertify that facility:
"Whatever legal rights the patients may have against Town Court for
9. Through Medicaid the federal government reimburses the states for a percentage of
expenditures for medical services rendered to eligible recipients by qualified providers.
The primary administrator in each state (usually called the Department of Health) must
administer the program in accordance with a state implementation plan required by 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The state must determine whether or not a
provider of services is qualified to participate under the applicable federal standards. 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(33)(B) (1976). A provider that fails to comply with the applicable stan-
dards for participation cannot be certified. The result is a loss of "qualified provider" status.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5), (23), (28) (1976 & Supp. 1111979).
Federal funds can be paid only on behalf of individuals receiving medical and/or nurs-
ing services from a "qualified provider." 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(b)(4)(i)(C) (1976). See also 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23), (28) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979); 45 C.F.R. § 249.33(a)(1), (4), (6), (10)
(1976). Subject to certain conditions, however, "the State agency may continue to claim
Federal financial participation in payments on behalf of eligible individuals for such serv-
ices furnished by such institution during a period not to exceed 30 days .. " 45 C.F.R.
§ 249.10(b)(4)(i)(C) (1976).
10. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entered
judgment for defendants, from which plaintiffs appealed. The court of appeals reversed, 586
F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1978), and certiorari was granted, 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
11. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTnoNAL LAW 514-22 (1978). See also
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
12. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
13. See L. TRInE, supra note 11, at 527-32. Professor Tribe describes the Court's recent
application of due process entitlement theory to cut back on the reasonable expectations of
individuals in their relations with the government when those expectations derive from in-
dependent sources such as state law and not from the "core" liberty and property concepts
grounded in the Constitution and common law. Tribes cites, as the first example of this
application, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
14. DPW is the state administrator of the Medicaid program. See note 8 supra.
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failing to maintain its status as a qualified skilled nursing home...
the enforcement by HEW and DPW of their valid regulations did not
directly affect their legal rights or deprive them of any constitutionally
protected interest in life, liberty, or property."1
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected reliance on the rea-
soning of an earlier appellate court decision, Klein v. Califano,16 that
had identified three Medicaid provisions as creating a "legitimate enti-
tlement to continued residency at the home of one's choice absent spe-
cific cause for transfer."1 7 The court in Klein so identified a statute
vesting in Medicaid beneficiaries the right to obtain services from any
qualified facility,' a regulation prohibiting certified facilities from
transferring or discharging a patient except for certain specified rea-
sons,19 and a regulation prohibiting the reduction or termination of
financial assistance without a hearing.20 The Court was also unper-
suaded by the residents' argument that transfer may engender such se-
vere physical and/or emotional impact as to constitute a deprivation of
life or liberty, thus requiring a due process hearing."1
At first blush, the Court's pronouncement would end the inquiry.
But close examination of O'Bannon, its predecessors and progeny,
reveals that the constitutional dimensions of transfer trauma remain to
be considered by the Supreme Court.22
15. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 790 (1980).
16. 586 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1978).
17. Id. at 258.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (Supp. II 1978) provides in relevant part: "[Any individ-
ual eligible for medical assistance (including drugs) may obtain such assistance from any
institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or
services required (including an organization which provides such services, or arranges for
their availability, on a prepayment basis), who undertakes to provide him such services
...." The same "free choice of providers" is also guaranteed by 42 C.F.R. § 431.51 (1979).
19. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k)(4) (1979) requires skilled nursing facilities licensed either as
Medicare or Medicaid providers to establish written policies and procedures to guarantee
that each resident admitted to the facility "[i]s transferred or discharged onlyfor medical
reasons, orfor his welfare or that of otherpatients, or for nonpayment of his stay (except as
prohibited by Titles XVIII or XIX of the Social Security Act), and is given reasonable ad-
vance notice to ensure orderly transfer or discharge. . ." (emphasis added).
20. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5) (1979) provides in relevant part that an "opportunity for a
hearing shall be granted to any applicant who requests a hearing because his or her claim for
financial assistance... or medical assistance is denied, . . . and to any recipient who is
aggrieved by any agency action resulting in suspension, reduction, discontinuance, or termi-
nation of assistance."
21. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
22. See Yaretsky v. Blum, 629 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 924 (1981).
See also Brede v. Director for the Dep't of Health, 616 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1980); Rockhill
Care Center, Inc. v. Harris, 502 F. Supp. 1227 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F.
Supp. 436 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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The viability of elderly Medicaid nursing home residents' interest
in liberty from transfer trauma, as a constitutional interest standing
alone, was not confronted by the majority in O'Bannot. Freedom from
transfer trauma instead was viewed as a mere adjunct to a property
entitlement claim in continued occupancy. Furthermore, it is urged
that the concurrence erred in concluding that the existence of the trans-
fer trauma phenomenon is not supported by substantial evidence and
that the interest is therefore undeserving of Fifth Amendment protec-
tion. This note posits not only that transfer trauma does exist, but that
its life threatening impact is forseeable. This premise was embraced by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the post-O'Bannon decision of
Yaretsky v. Blum,' 3 which held that elderly nursing home residents
possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding the fatal
potential of transfer trauma. However, the predecertification hearing
remedy provided in Yaretsky did not constitute meaningful due process
protection. The author proposes that meaningful due process protec-
tion can only be afforded if the various states are required to develop
and implement relocation plans tailored to counter the deleterious im-
pact of relocation trauma.24
L O'Bannon in Context: A Ruling Not Supported
by the Record
The procedural manner in which the transfer trauma interest came
before the Supreme Court is particularly noteworthy. As previously
observed,25 the residents sought a preliminary injunction to halt the
termination of payments in order to ensure continued occupancy.
They "alleged that termination of the payments would require Town
23. 629 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 924 (1981).
24. If liberty from transfer trauma is a fundamental interest, the state cannot relocate
frail elderly Medicaid beneficiaries without demonstrating a compelling state interest. See
Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). However, even if the state had a compelling
interest, it could not then proceed to relocate individuals in whatever manner it deemed fit.
Such latitude would violate the due process clause's mandate of fundamental fairness which
bars unbridled state action. Accordingly, since it is relocation that threatens elderly Medi-
caid beneficiaries' interest in freedom from unnecessary emotional and physical harm, any
meaningful due process safeguard must act on the relocation process itsef. This is precisely
why a procedural due process hearing prior to relocation does not safeguard against the
constitutional harm threatened. Here, the constitutional problem is not the withdrawal of a
statutory benefit without notice and hearing, but rather the state's contention that it may
relocate these fragile, elderly individuals absent a compelling state interest, and without a
plan tailored to mitigate the life threatening effects of transfer trauma. See, e.g., Bracco v.
Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436, 443-46 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See also Rockhill Care Center, Inc. v.
Harris, 502 F. Supp. 1227 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
25. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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Court to close and would cause the individual plaintiffs to suffer both a
loss of benefits and 'immediate and irreparable psychological and phys-
ical harm."' 26 The theory of psychological and physical harm alleged
in the complaint was linked by a conjunction to the entitlement allega-
tion. As a result, the allegation of harm did not stand alone, nor was
the interest specifically pleaded as liberty from transfer trauma. In
contrast, the benefit loss allegation was particularly pleaded as a termi-
nation of payment resulting in closure of the home. Thus, in
O'Bannon, as in each of its relevant predecessors, the interest in free-
dom from transfer trauma was presented as an adjunct to a property
entitlement claim in a last minute effort to maintain the status quo.27
The result is that transfer trauma has been repeatedly characterized as
a potentially irreparable harm in a fashion tailored to satisfy the stan-
dards for granting a preliminary injunction, but not as a constitutional
claim per se, appropriate for adjudication on the meritsfollowing impo-
sition of preliminary injunctive relief. This helps to explain why the
Court treated the interest in freedom from transfer trauma as though it
shared a common constitutional genesis with the property entitlement
claim.
Moreover, examination of the life and liberty interest in freedom
from transfer trauma reveals that a property entitlement claim to con-
tinued occupancy is not only a separate. interest, but is the secondary,
rather than the primary, interest at stake. The elderly Medicaid nurs-
ing home residents of O'Bannon did not seek equitable relief simply "to
remain in the home of their choice ' 28 pending an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether "good cause for transfer" existed.29 Rather, they
sought protection from likely death or serious illness in the wake of
involuntary, haphazard relocation. The fact that an evidentiary decer-
tification hearing was the only remedy sought further substantiates the
proposition that freedom from transfer trauma did not stand squarely
26. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. at 777 (emphasis added).
27. See, e.g., Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436, 447 (N.D. Cal. 1978), in which the
court explains the pressure under which it was forced to act. "The Court specifically re-
quested counsel for the Department to determine whether the Department would be willing
to maintain the status quo, Ze., maintenance of adequate levels of care at the Center. How-
ever, the Department declared its unwillingness to maintain the status quo for more than
about three days. The Department took this position even though that status quo was essen-
tial to the preservation of this Court's power to render a meaningful decision on the merits,
even of this motion for a preliminary injunction, let alone the merits of plaintiffs' claims for
final adjudication of federal statutory and Constitutional rights." Id. at 447. See also Brede
v. Director for the Dep't of Health, 616 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1980).
28. 447 U.S. at 784.
29. Id.
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before the Court as a constitutional interest. Since an evidentiary hear-
ing on the merits of the facility's decertification would not mitigate the
seriousness of the physical and emotional harm threatened by transfer
trauma, effective relief would have to address the transfer process it-
self. 0 The formulation and implementation of a relocation plan tai-
lored to minimize the impact of the damage threatened would
constitute the only meaningful due process remedy.31
Although the Court claimed that its opinion weighed the risk of
transfer trauma, it seems clear that the posited interest was viewed as de
minimus, particularly in light of the dearth of evidence before the
Court.32 Justice Blackmun, although concurring in the judgment, not
only stated that the interest in freedom from transfer trauma should be
constitutionally analyzed separately from the entitlement interest,33 but
expressed alarm at the lack of evidence and the consequent risk. Jus-
tice Blackmun stated,
I question whether the life and liberty interest decided by the
Court is properly presented. The District Court refused to extend
a preliminary injunction after a brief hearing. In that court, the
plaintiffs only touched on the concept of transfer trauma. There
was no explicit argument that the patients were threatened with a
deprivation of life or liberty; rather, the danger of transfer
trauma was noted only as a circumstance raising a likelihood of
irreparable injury justifying injunctive relief. . . . The transfer
trauma studies cited to this Court were not cited to the District
Judge. Testimony regarding transfer trauma was limited to the
little-explained assertion of an expert witness that removal would
subject some patients in the group to endangerment of their lives
or aggravation of their illnesses. . . . In the Court of Appeals,
the patients again did not contend that decertification exposed
them to a deprivation of life or liberty . . . . It is to be
remembered that this case arises from the refusal to extend a pre-
liminary injunction-an order preceded by limited development
30. See note 24 supra.
31. Cf. Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436, 445-46 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (explaining why
the absence of such a plan presents a "substantial danger" to elderly residents' health and
well-being and summarizing some of the factors critical to formulating a relocation plan).
32. The Court stated, "The patients cite a number of studies indicating that removal to
another home may cause 'transfer trauma,' increasing the possibility of death or serious
illness for elderly, infirm patients .... In denying the motion for a preliminary injunction,
the District Court did not take evidence or make any findings on the harm that might result
from a transfer. Nevertheless, we assume for purposes of this decision that there is a risk
that some residents may encounter severe emotional and physical hardship as a result of a
transfer." 447 U.S. at 784 n.16 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 790 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Winter 19821 TRANSFER TRAUMA
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
of the record and not guided by focused presentation of legal
arguments.34
As a result of the evidentiary void, the Court considered the inter-
est in liberty from transfer trauma as triggered by only a hypothetical
risk of harm.35 That the Court viewed the harm as hypothetical helps
to explain the path of its due process entitlement reasoning. The ma-
jority's conclusion turned on the application of a test to determine
whether or not the withdrawal of benefits was a direct or indirect result
of decertification. 36 The Court reasoned that since decertification was a
lawful exercise of state power, any harm resulting from the exercise of
that power could be viewed only as an indirect consequence undeserv-
ing of Fifth Amendment interdiction.37 The majority concluded,
"[T]hat the decertification of a home may lead to severe hardship for
some of its elderly residents does not turn the decertification into a gov-
ernmental decision to impose that harm.
'38
Justice Blackmun's concurrence questioned the relevance of this
observation: "When the Government erroneously commits a person to
a mental hospital, it is not 'deci[ding] to impose. . . harm' either. But
we have recognized that the risk that such action 'may lead to severe
hardship' is sufficiently great to justify a hearing for the transferee.
'39
Justice Blackmun also found overly simplistic and irrelevant the major-
ity's analysis as to whether or not the residents' losses are properly la-
beled direct or indirect. In criticizing the test applied by the majority,
34. Id. at 802-03 n.10 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
35. See note 32 supra.
36. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
37. 447 U.S. at 789. "Over a century ago this Court recognized the principle that the
due process provision of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the indirect adverse affects
of governmental action." Id. at 789 (citing the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457,
551 (1870)).
The Court then went on to support its conclusion that decertification triggering transfer
can result in only consequential injuries by analogizing the residents' alleged interest to the
argument (which the Court had recently rejected) made by the parents of a girl murdered by
a parolee. In Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), the murdered girl's parents con-
tended that a California statute granting absolute immunity to the parole board with respect
to its release decisions deprived their daughter of her life without due process of law. The
Court in Martinez concluded, "A legislative decision that has an incremental impact on the
probability that death will result in any given situation--such as setting the speed limit at
55-miles-per-hour instead of 45-cannot be characterized as state action depriving a person
of life just because it may set in motion a chain of events that ultimately leads to the random
death of an innocent bystander." Id. at 281.
38. 447 U.S. at 789.




he pointed out that the primary purpose of decertification is to force
residents to relocate:
40
I have no quarrel with the Court's observation that the Due Pro-
cess Clause generally is unconcerned with 'indirect' losses ....
To say that the decertification decision directly affects the home
is not to say that it 'indirectly' affects the patients. Transfer is not
only the 'nevitable. . . clearlyforeseeable consequence of decer-
tIication, /but] a basic purpose of decertfcation is to force patients
to relocate.
41
Therefore, whether or not the allegedly life-threatening effects of
forced relocation are labeled direct or indirect begs the question. The
real life result is that once a facility is decertified, the residents are relo-
cated. The pivotal question, then, is: What degree of harm does forced
relocation threaten?
Although the majority assumed some danger to residents' lives
and health might be the "indirect" result of relocation, the majority's
conclusion (resulting from application of the test) precluded inquiry
into the foreseeable degree of harm threatened. For this reason, the
majority felt itself under no compulsion to evaluate the transfer trauma
studies cited to the Court. Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, ac-
knowledged a judicial responsibility at least to consider the evidence
regarding transfer trauma before determining whether or not the inter-
est is constitutionally cognizable. But he concluded,
[T]he patients cannot establish that transfer trauma is so substan-
tial a danger as to justify the conclusion that transfers deprive
them of life or liberty. Substantial evidence suggests that 'trans-
fer trauma' does not exist, and many informed researchers have
concluded at least that this danger is unproved. Recognition of a
constitutional right plainly cannot rest on such an inconclusive
body of research and opinion.42
II. The Reality of Transfer Trauma
Contrary to Justice Blackmun's conclusion, substantial evidence
shows not only that transfer trauma exists, but that its life threatening
impact is foreseeable and can be substantially mitigated through proper
relocation planning. The medical literature and the leading expert re-
search, including the studies cited to the Court, stand for two proposi-
tions: 1) That elderly residents who are forced to move suffer higher
mortality rates than non-relocated control groups; and 2) That pre-
40. In support of this conclusion, Blackmun observed, ."Thus, not surprisingly,
§ 1396(a)(23) specifically ties the patient's right to continued residence in a home to qualifi-
cation of the facility." 447 U.S. at 794.
41. Id. at 793-94 (Blackmun, 3., concurring) (citations omitted & emphasis added).
42. Id. at 804. See also id. at 804 n.13 (citing relocation studies).
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relocation preparation programs increase the predictability of the new
environment and effectively reduce mortality rates.43
Apparently contradictory findings of studies do not necessarily
mean that those studies fail to present substantial evidence demonstrat-
ing the severe harm threatened by transfer trauma. All the relevant
data must be closely scrutinized in order to develop a comprehensive
analytical framework for determination of what constitutes substantial
evidence of transfer trauma and what does not. 4 Dr. Leon Pastalan,
43. L. Pastalan, Relocation, supra note 2, at 23.
44. The Court's decision in O'Bannon was based on the erroneous premise that the
transfer trauma phenomenon is unproven. The Court was misled by unsupported research
findings to the detriment of the lives and health of elders living in government regulated
nursing homes. The studies that the Court relied on are not credible because the researchers
drew their conclusions without applying any meaningful analytical framework to their ob-
servations.
These faulty research findings were recently discredited in Bourestom & Pastalan, The
Effects ofRelocation on the Eldery: A Reply to Borup, Ji, Gallego. D. T, & Heffernan, P. G.,
21 GERONTOLOGIST 4 (1981), Bourestom and Pastalan responded to the Borup group's con-
tention that transfer trauma is a myth and relocation planning unnecessary: "We regard
these recommendations as dangerously irresponsible . . . . The conclusions upon which
they are based are naive and fallacious." Id. at 4-5.
The research conclusions relied on by the Court in O'Bannon are invalidated where
comprehended within a meaningful analytical framework: "[I]f one examines the studies to
which Borup refers, one finds that virtually all of them were different from one another with
respect to the conditions of relocation and the characteristics of the populations under study.
Thus, the [Borup group] lump[s] together and treats as the same relocations under voluntary
circumstances with those that were forced, relocations that involved moderate environmen-
tal change with those that involved radical environmental change, relocation programs that
included extensive preparation with those that included no preparation and, finally, reloca-
tions that involved the moves of healthy elderly populations in the community with those
that involved sick and debilitated populations residing in institutions. Among the 12 studies
cited by Borup as yielding negative findings with respect to relocation effects, virtually all of
the relocations were positive with respect to the conditions we have described and would not
be expected to yield negative results ....
"Failure to take account of, or at least describe these crucial qualifying conditions is
also apparent in the [Borup group's] own study ....
".... [A] key characteristic that must attend any study of this kind is the physical and
mental health status of the patients. The [Borup group] come[s] close to ignoring this
point ....
"... No data are presented on the level of care these patients required, on the type and
extent of their disabilities, on their mental impairment, sensory problems, ability to perform
the activities of daily living or on the comparability of the experimental and control groups
with respect to these crucial characteristics. Like the studies they group together, the investi-
gators have fallen into the trap of grouping all patients together and treating them as if they
were similar.
"We feel that [these] studies and recommendations cannot be taken seriously. The
question no longer is whether relocation has negative (or positive) effects but under what
conditions and with what kinds of populations are those negative or positive effects most
likely to be observed... . [R]adical and involuntary relocation of frail elderly individuals
carries with it potentially high risks. Ample data as well as casual observation support this
Wol. 9.429
addressing this point, concluded,
A major reason for the apparently contradictory findings is that
underlying all the conclusions are qualifying factors such as the
characteristics of the people being moved, and of the receiving
facility; the reasons for the move, and its meaning to the mover;
and the helping techniques used to facilitate the moves. Thus,
the results can be said to revolve around five major factors:
- the degree of choice in making the move.
- the degree of environmental change.
- the degree of health.
- the degree ofpreparation.
the methodology utilized in the study.45
Moreover, whenever the courts have received evidence on the phenom-
enon of transfer trauma, they have consistently concluded that the
overwhelming weight of the evidence, both in volume and credibility,
supports the conclusion that abrupt relocation threatens both the lives
and health of fragile, elderly nursing home residents.46 The House of
notion. Those of us responsible for the care and treatment of the elderly are remiss if we do
not recognize these risks and act to minimize them." Id. at 6-7.
45. L. Pastalan, Relocation, supra note 2, at 2. The importance of adhering to a com-
prehensive analytical framework is demonstrated by the faulty conclusion reached in Borup,
Gallego & Heffernan, Relocation and its Effect on Mortality, 19 GERONTOLOGIST 135, 136
(1979) (noting that six previous studies found increased mortality rates while twelve did not:
"findings have been ambiguous and appear to be contradictory") cited in O'Bannon, 447
U.S. at 804 n.13 (Blackmun, ., concurring). For example, the Borup study itself did not
base its conclusions on any of the five major analytical factors. The study, which concluded
that "relocation does not increase the probability of mortality," is therefore fatally flawed.
See Borup, Gallego & Heffernan, supra, at 138. The only conclusion reached by the study is
that "the lower mortality rate of the relocated patients was a result of age and not of reloca-
tion." Id. at 138. In other words, the study reaches no conclusion regarding relocation
trauma. Seeid. at 137-38 (summary of findings). Rather, it appears to stand for the proposi-
tion that a particular patient characteristic affects mortality rates, i.e., that the younger the
resident, the less likely he or she is to die as a proximate consequence of relocation. This
finding is consistent with the literature, as advanced age has long been acknowledged a
strong predictor of mortality following relocation. See, e.g., L. Pastalan, supra note 2, at 20.
46. See Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1978), where the court
concludes, "Plaintiffs claim that the described consequences of forced removal, or the threat
of it, are symptomatic of a phenomenon termed 'transfer trauma,' characterized by physical
and emotional deterioration as well as by increased rates of mortality. While there was
some conflict in the evidence on this issue, the Court finds the overwhelming weight, both in
volume and credibility, to support plaintiffs."
The court described the effects of transfer trauma on particular plaintiffs: "Patients and
their friends or relatives have been found weeping with fear and distress .... In some
cases, supportive patient friendships have been undermined even though both patients re-
main at the Center. Mary H., 83, diabetic and totally blind and Mary B., 85, suffering from
two broken hips and chronic alcoholism, developed a close supportive friendship as room-
mates for a year. As the Center has been depopulated, their floor was closed and they were
moved to new rooms, with new roommates, on different floors. . . Mary B. . . . has suf-
fered from continual symptoms of nausea, diarrhea and loss of appetite. Mary H. complains
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Representatives Select Committee on Aging has reached the same
conclusion.47
Additionally, if the phenomenon of transfer trauma does not exist,
any relocation plan would fail to mitigate transfer trauma's life threat-
ening effects. Such is not the case. Beginning in 1976, a model reloca-
tion plan for involuntary nursing home relocation was successfully
implemented in Pennsylvania. 48  The results demonstrate clearly not
only that transfer trauma is a real, rather than a hypothetical, harm, but
that its foreseeable devastating consequences can be mitigated
substantially.
49
Although the O'Bannon majority failed to confront squarely the
discrete interest of Medicaid beneficiaries in freedom from transfer
trauma, it is clear that responsibility for that failure cannot entirely be
laid at the door of the Court. The alleged interest was not permitted to
stand alone for the Court's scrutiny; available relevant evidence was
not in the record and hence not considered by the Court. These serious
flaws in the review gave rise to Justice Blackmun's misgivings. In ef-
fect, the majority attempted to dismiss the interest without so much as
quantifying the gravity of the harm threatened. As Justice Blackmun
stated, "By focusing solely on the 'indirectness' of resulting physical
and psychological trauma, the Court implies that regardless of the de-
gree of the demonstrated risk that widespread illness or even death at-
tends decertification-induced transfers, it is of no moment. I cannot
join such a heartless holding."50
'Why did they separate us? Why did they take my eyes from me?' In another case, the
patient did not survive the initial move between floors of the Center. . . . In the profes-
sional opinion of their treating physician, the deaths of Connie W. and Ellis W. were caus-
ally related to the trauma associated with ongoing relocation. Id. at 444-45. See also
cases cited in notes 5 & 22 supra.
47. Closing of Post Street Convalescent Home: Hearings Before the House Select Comna
on Aging, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-76 (1978). See also id. at 35 (testimony of Dr. Arthur
Schwartz, University of Southern California Andrus Gerontology Center). "Clearly, the
cure [referring to relocation as a result of decertification] is worse than the disease. Reloca-
tion trauma is not a professional buzz word. It should be recognized for exactly what it
represents, an intolerable stress which can and frequently does result in the untimely, tragic,
unnecessary death of the older person." Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
48. L. Pastalan, Relocation, supra note 2, at 19.
49. The impact of the model relocation plan was measured by comparing mortality
rates between the relocated nursing home residents and the nursing home population at
large. "For 236 persons relocated between July 1975 and July 1976 the mortality rate was
11%, as compared to 26.6% for Pennsylvania and 27.5% for the United States." Id.
50. 447 U.S. at 803 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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III. Transfer Trauma as a Fundamental Life and Liberty
Interest
A. Constitutional Considerations
Medicaid nursing home residents are entitled to the protections of
the due process clause when the facilities in which they reside are
threatened with closure. They have a life and liberty interest in not
being exposed unnecessarily and arbitrarily to the deleterious effects of
transfer trauma.
The interest urged by elderly Medicaid nursing home residents in
need of continuity in their specialized care has its roots in the founda-
tion of our American constitutional system of government. The inter-
est dates from the time of Blackstone, whose vision of liberty guided
the Framers of the Bill of Rights. Blackstone's perception of liberty
embraced the belief that "[t]he right of personal security consists in a
person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his
body, his health, and his reputation."5 Certainly a government's deci-
sion to decertify a home, if that decision will result in haphazardly
planned relocation which engenders a substantial risk of death or seri-
ous mental and physical illness, is within the ambit of liberties enunci-
ated by Blackstone. Justice Blackmun embraced a parallel
constitutional analysis in his opinion in O'Bannon and concluded,
"[W]here such drastic consequences attend governmental action, their
foreseeability, at least generally, must suffice to require input by those
who must endure them."52 This line of reasoning, if accepted, would
require due process intervention prior to relocation since the conse-
quences of transfer trauma are foreseeable.53
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the due process clause
protects the interest in liberty from physical and psychological harm in
Roe v. Wade.54 In Roe the Court found that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action
was broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.55 Significantly, the Court reasoned that the
state could not prevent a woman from terminating her pregnancy dur-
51. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARmIES *129.
52. 447 U.S. at 803 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53. See text accompanying note 50 supra. See also critique of studies cited by Justice
Blackmun, note 44 supra.
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. Although the Roe decision is most frequently cited as a right to privacy case, its
reasoning loses no force when applied in support of the proposition that elderly Medicaid
beneficiaries have a fundamental liberty interest in avoiding the unnecessary effects of trans-
fer shock. As pointed out by the Court, the particular right to privacy found in Roe has its
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ing the first trimester because continued pregnancy could be more dan-
gerous to the woman's physical and mental health than an abortion.
The Court explained,
The detriment that the State would impose upon the preg-
nant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Spe-
cific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring,
may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psycho-
logical harm may be imminent.s6
Similarly, in the companion case of Doe v. Bolton, 7 Justice Doug-
las explained in his concurring opinion why "the freedom to care for
one's health '"58 constitutes a fundamental liberty interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. As in Roe, the threat of both immediate
and future physical and psychological harm was used to explain why a
woman must be left free to determine whether or not to bear a child.
Specific findings of harm threatening the physical health of the woman
included the possible discomfort and pain of pregnancy and childbirth
and its concomitant higher mortality rate.59 The emotional health of
the woman was held unjustifiably threatened by the denial of the right
to terminate pregnancy in its early stages. Specific findings of unjustifi-
ably imposed psychological harm included suffering, dislocations and
misery.
60
Given the reasoning of Roe and Doe, it follows that elderly Medi-
caid nursing home residents possess a similar fundamental life and lib-
erty interest in protecting themselves from exposure to the unnecessary
dangerous effects of transfer trauma. The compelling state interest here
is the health and welfare of the residents, and because involuntary relo-
cation may be more dangerous to residents' fragile physical and mental
health than continued occupancy in a substandard home, the state
should be barred from transferring residents in the absence of a finding
that relocation with its accompanying risks is less dangerous to resi-
dents' lives and health than continued occupancy. 61 Additionally, in
genesis in the broader Fourteenth Amendment concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon capricious state action. Id. at 153.
56. 410 U.S. at 153.
57. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
58. Id. at 213.
59. Id. at 179.
60. Id. at 216.
61. See Rockhill Care Center, Inc. v. Harris, 502 F. Supp. 1227 (W.D. Mo. 1980), in
which the court held that a nursing home was entitled to a preliminary injunction to halt
transfer and to continue the payment of Medicaid funding where there was little basis for
concluding that the nursing home was not presently suitable for Medicaid patients, or that
the environment in the home would not have been superior to the situation the patients
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the event that transfer becomes unavoidable, the state should be pre-
pared to set into motion a relocation plan designed to minimize the
dangerous effects of relocation. The absence of such a plan necessarily
renders barren the interest of elderly Medicaid residents in liberty from
unnecessary physical and emotional trauma at the hands of the state.
A constitutional analysis similar to that applied in Roe and Doe
has been used to bar the states from administering dangerous psycho-
tropic medications to committed mental patients against their will.
62
The psychotropic medication cases are generally based on the individ-
ual's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment as an aspect of liberty
or privacy. However, the interest urged by elderly Medicaid benefi-
ciaries is analogous to that posited by committed psychiatric patients,
63
since the core of the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is the
right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions that violate
personal security.' Certainly, abrupt, haphazard relocation of elderly
Medicaid nursing home residents, absent a compelling state interest,
constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal security.65
An appreciation of the nature and impact of nursing home institu-
tionalization on the residents, as individuals and as mutually interde-
pendent members of a community, is required to understand why
would face if forced to relocate, despite the fact that the facility had already been decertified.
"Perhaps the only policy consideration favoring the agencies is the possible loss of cred-
ibility of their decertification procedures. Decertification is presented to the Court as the
sole means available for maintaining standards. In a situation where there was less depen-
dence on Medicaid funding, and more credible alternatives for residents, the Court might be
impressed by this argument. In the present context, however, defendants are asking the
Court to stand aside while they 'throw the baby out with the bathwater.'" Id. at 1231.
62. See, ag., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1360 (D. Mass. 1979), rev'd in part,
vacated and remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 451 U.S. 906 (1981). See
also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
63. See, eg., Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980) (applying the reasoning of
Roe and holding that forcible medication of mental patients, absent an emergency, violates
their fundamental right to privacy in decisions concerning their own bodies), cert. granted,
451 U.S. 906 (1981).
64. See, ag., Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914) in which Judge Cardozo stated, "Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.... ." Cf. Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977), in which the Court stated: "Among the historic liberties
... was a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on
personal security."
65. Even though the psychotropic drug cases may be distinguished by the fact that they
involve physical invasions of the body cavity (i.e., the administering of a pill or injection),
the distinction does not appear persuasive. Forced evacuation from a facility that an indi-
vidual considers home, which engenders a substantial physical and emotional risk to life and
health, appears at least as invasive of personal security as forcing potentially dangerous
psychotropic medications on an already involuntarily committed psychiatric patient.
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liberty from transfer trauma is an interest that should be deemed fun-
damental. A nursing home is an institution that houses individuals in
need of frequent nursing attention for long periods of time. Most resi-
dents are elderly; their mean age is eighty.66 The average length of stay
is 1.6 years.67 While most nursing home residents are physically depen-
dent on assistance in basic activities of daily life,68 they are also often
isolated from the community beyond the facility. More than half of all
nursing home residents have no close family ties or visits with friends.69
As a result, the only human and social interaction many residents expe-
rience takes place solely within the nursing home with other residents
and staff.
The physical, emotional and financial dependency of the Medicaid
nursing home population renders the institution more than merely the
provider of nursing and medical services. Nursing homes become, in
most instances, the entire and only world known to their residents. In-
deed nursing homes have been likened to migrant labor camps because
of the substantial control exercised over residents.7" No similar anal-
ogy has ever been drawn to describe other classifications of health care
providers.7" It is not surprising, then, that any disruption in the nursing
home's fragile environment-particularly one so drastic as involuntary,
abrupt transfer-can have a devastating impact on the health and lives
of residents.72 Certainly loss of home, separation from family and
66. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NURSING HOME UTILIZATION IN
CALIFORNIA, ILLINOIS, MASSACHUSETTS, NEW YORK AND TEXAS: 1977 NATIONAL NURS-
ING HOME SURVEY 4 (Vital and Health Statistics Ser. 13-No. 48).
67. Id.
68. The followiing statistics reveal the levels of functional dependence of Medicaid nurs-
ing home residents: In 1977, 86% required assistance in bathing, 69% required assistance in
dressing, 53% required assistance in using the bathroom, 33% required assistance in eating,
and 66% were chairfast, bedfast or walked only with assistance. Id. See also U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 1977 NATIONAL NURSING HOME SURVEY 43-52 (Vital and
Health Statistics Ser. 13-No. 43).
69. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, SUBCOMM. ON LONG-TERM CARE NURSING
HOME CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: FAILURE IN PUBLIC POLICY, INTRODUCTORY RE-
PORT, S. REP. No. 1420, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974).
70. "Nursing homes and migrant labor camps are analogous environments since both
the labor camp and the nursing home are usually isolated from the general society; residents
of both are recognized as having problems deserving of governmental attention; both groups
are confined to the premises of the property either by necessity, or through choice predicated
on compelling social realities existing outside the borders of the camp." Comment, Nursing
Home Access: Making the Patient Bill of Rights Work, 54 J. URB. LAw 473, 497 (1977).
71. Id.
72. The following statement dramatically demonstrates why the degree of interdepen-
dence among nursing home residents makes the disruption of relocation so dangerous:
"My name is Anna Smiliansky. I was born in Russia 83 years ago. When the revolu-
tion broke out in 1917, we fled to Manchuria, then to Shanghai, where we lived for 17 years.
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friends, and substantial risk to health (and possibly to life itself) all
deprive residents of basic standards of life and decency which are "fun-
damental" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
73
How, then, did the Supreme Court escape the conclusion that
transfer trauma poses a substantial threat to Medicaid nursing home
residents' constitutional rights? It appears that the Court avoided ex-
amining the individual's interest in freedom from transfer trauma by
focusing solely on the beneficent purpose of decertification which pur-
ports to protect elderly Medicaid recipients interest as a class. There-
fore, although the Supreme Court in O'annon did not squarely face
the risk of harm from transfer trauma, it reasoned that decertification
followed by transfer works to the benefit of relocated residents "as a
whole."'74 The Court concluded that decertification triggering reloca-
tion "involves the Government's attempt to confer an indirect benefit
on Medicaid patients by imposing and enforcing minimum standards
of care on facilities like Town Court. 75 The Court's reasoning as-
sumes that decertification is an effective means of enforcing minimum
standards of care.76
The presumption that decertification constitutes a meaningful en-
forcement mechanism is without foundation. That decertification is an
ineffective means of enforcing minimum standards of care is substanti-
ated by the fact that both the states and the Department of Health and
Human Services rarely decertify nursing homes from eligibility to par-
ticipate in the Medicaid program even in the face of pervasive deficien-
cies.77 The most common practice is to require plans of correction.78
My husband worked for an American firm there. Then the Chinese revolution broke out, so
we had to leave again. We went to Israel and lived there for five years.
"We came to San Francisco in 1967, and opened a cleaning establishment here, but
only a few months later, my husband died.
"Now I get only a widow's pension through Social Security.
"I have lived in this hospital since 1975, when the doctor said that because of my heart
condition and severe arthritis, and the fact that I had had several falls, I must come here.
"Now I feel this is my home. My only friend is here. Please don't make me move."
Statement of Anna Smiliansky (Feb 19, 1979) (written in support of motion for preliminary
injunction to halt relocation in Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Cal. 1978)).
73. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
74. 447 U.S. at 789-90 n.22 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 787.
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(19) (1976), which provides that the Medicaid program be
carried out in a manner ensuring the "best interests of the recipients."
77. Regan, Wen Nursing Home Patients Complaim The Ombudsman or the Patient Ad-
vocate, 65 GEo. L.J. 691, 693-94 (1977); Regan, Quality Assurance Systems in Nursing
Homes, 53 J. U". L. 153, 180-85 (1975); Comment, Regulation of Nursing Homes-Ade-
quate Protectionfor the Nation's Elderly?, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 309, 320 (1976).
78. 42 C.F.R. § 442.251(b) (1980). In 1974, for example, of 7,000 Medicaid nursing
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State agencies are understandably hesitant to impose this drastic
sanction, fully aware that the Medicaid bed shortage may mean that
there simply is no facility (let alone a better facility) to which residents
can be relocated.7 9 As a result, while the government may be attempt-
ing to enforce minimum standards (albeit for the most part with quali-
fied success), it is at the same time risking the lives and health of those
it has voluntarily undertaken to protect without giving them the benefit
of due process.
B. Yaretsky v. B/na A Finding of Transfer Trauma Despite O'Bannon
Despite the Supreme Court's earlier decision in O'Bannon, the
Second Circuit, in Yaretsky v. Blum,8" recognized the great physical
and emotional harm threatened by transfer trauma. In Yaretsky,
Medicaid nursing home residents sought an injunction on due process
grounds when threatened with a precipitous transfer resulting from an
HEW regulatory Utilization Review.81 The Second Circuit held that
Medicaid patients have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
avoiding the effects of transfer trauma.82 The court found that patients
are entitled to due process even if transferred from a lower level of care
to a higher one, and even if the transfer is initiated by private physi-
cians.83  This conclusion departs significantly from the Supreme
Court's reasoning in O'Bannon in two major respects.
First, the decision in Yaretsky rejects the contention that transfer
by a private physician is an indirect consequence of state action and is
therefore undeserving of Fifth Amendment interdiction. The court
noted that when a patient is transferred either to a lower or to a higher
level of care the state Medicaid authorities adjust the patient's benefits.
homes, 4,776 homes with deficiencies were certified with six-month timetables for correction,
while only 327 homes were decertified by the states. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING,
supra note 70, at 104.
79. Indeed, decertification of a facility may actually result in discontinuance or termina-
tion of medical assistance if alternative Medicaid beds are not found for the residents who
must be moved. Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436,444 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See BrownAn
Appraisal of the Nursing Home Enforcement Process, 17 ARiz. L. REv. 304, 324-56 (1975), in
which the author discussed more flexible enforcement mechanisms such as citation systems
and receiverships. See also Rockhill Care Center, Inc. v. Harris, 502 F. Supp. 1227 (1980).
80. 629 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 925 (1981).
81. Utilization Review is a procedure promulgated through HEW regulations requiring
state Medicaid authorities to audit patients in order to determine whether or not they require
lesser or greater levels of care. A determination that an individual requires a lesser level of
care results in a decrease in financial benefits; a determination that an individual requires a
higher level of care results in an increase in financial benefits. Id. at 819-20.
82. Id. at 821.
83. Id. at 820.
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"The state has, in essence, delegated a decision to increase or reduce a
public assistance recipient's benefits to a 'private' party; but such a del-
egation cannot prevent due process guarantees from attaching. 84
Second, the court rejected the notion espoused by the Court in
O'Bannon, that transfer of a patient to a higher level of care deserves
no due process protection because such transfer involves no withdrawal
of "direct benefits" which are "essentially financial in character."85 Al-
though the court in Yaretsky recognized that transfer from a lower to a
higher level of care necessarily involves no withdrawal of protected
financial statutory entitlement benefits, the court nonetheless held that
"a patient's interest in avoiding the effects of 'transfer trauma' is a con-
stitutionally protected 'liberty interest.' "86 Clearly, the court in Yaret-
sky viewed liberty from transfer trauma, in and of itself, as a viable
constitutional interest protected by due process.
The court also attempted to distinguish the facts before it from
those in O'Bannon in order to avoid the conclusion reached by the
Supreme Court (i.e., that decertification triggering transfer does not
cause Medicaid recipients to suffer an injury "direct" enough to result
in a deprivation of life, liberty or property).87 The court justified its
holding by noting that the situation before it involved the decision to
transferparticular patients, rather than to decertify the facility.88 The
court went on to state:
Moreover, O'Bannon was not decided on the basis of a record
that included much detailed information about the existence of
transfer trauma. . . .We note that the record in this case con-
tains ample evidence that transfer of elderly patients, even when
it does not pose an increased risk of mortality, carries with it the
undeniable possibility of emotional and psychological harm-at
least in the case of many individuals. To us this does not seem
any less a 'liberty interest' than a prison inmate's interest in not
being transferred from a penitentiary to a psychiatric
hospital ....89
84. Id.
85. 447 U.S. at 786-87.
86. 629 F.2d at 821.
87. Id. The court in Yaretsky v. Blun asserted, "We do not believe, however, that
O'Bannon forecloses the question whether there is a liberty interest in avoidance of transfer
trauma. . . ." Id.
88. Id. The relevance of this factual distinction is doubtful since either decision may
result in the involuntary transfer of the individual. See text accompanying note 41 supra, in
which Justice Blackmun, concurring in O'Bannon, criticizes the majority's rejection of reli-
ance on transfer trauma as denial of a liberty interest because "decertification. . .is not the
same for purposes of due process analysis as a decision to transfer a particular patient." 447
U.S. at 793.
89. 629 F.2d at 821. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), in which the Court held
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Significantly, before the Yaresky injunction was made permanent,
the parties entered into a consent decree embodying several procedural
safeguards with respect to patient transfers.90 The state's consent to the
formulation and implementation of a relocation plan tailored to lessen
the physical and emotional havoc of precipitous, involuntary relocation
reflects the growing awareness of state and federal officials alike that
when relocation is necessary, humane and orderly relocation planning
is also necessary.9'
Conclusion: The Due Process Remedy
Since 1974 the federal courts have consistently recognized the sub-
stantial risk of physical and psychological harm posed by involuntary
relocation of Medicaid nursing home residents.92 Yaretsky held that
residents have a constitutionally cognizable interest in liberty from the
effects of transfer trauma deserving of due process protection.
93
The pivotal question remains: what process is due? That pre-
decertification hearings cannot mitigate the harm threatened to elderly
residents' physical and mental health is a crucial consideration. 94 Since
that a prisoner has a liberty interest in not being transferred from a prison to a mental
hospital without procedural protections, including a finding that he is suffering from a
mental illness for which he cannot secure adequate treatment in prison. See note 39 and
accompanying text supra, in which Justice Blackmun reaches the same conclusion in
O'Bannon.
90. 629 F.2d at 820.
91. See L. Pastalan, Relocation, supra note 2, at Appendix: Summary of State of Penn-
sylvania Relocation Plan. See also Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436, 445 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (brief discussion of the crucial aspects of a proper relocation plan); HEW Administra-
tion on Aging, Technical Assistance Memorandum (no. 75-1 February 19, 1975), stating,
"There is a genuine hazard in the relocation of infirm aging persons from one facility to
another. Dramatic increases [in mortality rates] far in excess of what would normally be
expected have been documented." (quoted in Klein v. Mathews, 430 F. Supp. 1005, 1009
(D.N.J. 1977)).
92. See note 5 & 22 supra.
93. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
94. The purpose of decertification hearings is to determine whether or not "good cause
for transfer" exists. O'Bannon, 447 U.S. at 784. Decertification hearings, when granted, do
not address the merits of the relocation decision and therefore do not affect the transfer
process. The only meaningful purpose such hearings could fulfill in relation to elderly
Medicaid beneficiaries' interest in freedom from transfer trauma would be to determine
whether or not a compelling state interest necessitating transfer exists (Ze., whether or not
continued occupancy poses a greater threat to residents' lives and health than does transfer).
See Rockhill Care Center, Inc. v. Harris, 502 F. Supp. 1227, 1232 (1980) ("Except for Town
Court, the case law on pretermination hearing rights in nursing home medicaid cases has
seemed to fall into two classifications: (1) where sign#Fcant safety conditions were at issue,
emergency terminations of benefits would be sanctioned, with full evidentiary hearings de-
ferred [see, e.g., Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1975)]; (2) where less pressing
health and safety conditions were in question, a pretermination evidentiary hearing before
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it is the relocation process that threatens elderly Medicaid beneficiaries'
interest in freedom from unjustified emotional and physical harm, any
meaningful due process safeguard must affect the relocation process it-
self. Therefore, the most sensible, effective solution appears to be the
formulation and implementation of relocation plans designed to miti-
gate the disastrous effects of transfer trauma should relocation become
unavoidable.95 This is the most meaningful way to prevent the species
of unbridled state discretion that has resulted in the dangerously hap-
hazard relocation of elderly Medicaid beneficiaries.96 The apparent be-
an independent hearing officer would be required [See, e.g., Hathaway v. Mathews, 546
F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1976)]" (emphasis added and citations & footnote omitted)).
95. See note 24 supra. There is no reason why a court of competent jurisdicition could
not order the formulation and implementation of a relocation plan tailored to mitigate the
lifethreatening effects of transfer trauma if it deemed fit. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held, in a variety of contexts, that once a constitutional violation has occurred, a court has
broad powers to remedy that violation. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). It is axiomatic that this authority is not limited by actions taken by
the state legislature. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958); United States v.
Peters, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 115 (1809).
Particularly relevant to this discussion is Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.
1977), in which the Minnesota Legislature refused to appropriate funds to improve an insti-
tution for the mentally retarded pursuant to a cqurt order. In response to a claim that the
state's obligation is subject to what action the legislature may take on a specific budget
request, the court stated, "If Minnesota chooses to operate hospitals for the mentally re-
tarded, the operation must meet minimal constitutional standards, and that obligation may
not be permitted to yield to financial considerations. . . .There must be no mistake in the
matter. The obligation of the defendants to eliminate existing unconstitutionalities does not
depend upon what the Legislature may do, or upon what the Governor may do, or, indeed,
upon what the defendants may be able to accomplish with means available to them. As
stated, if Minnesota is going to operate institutions like Cambridge, their operation is going
to have to be consistent with the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 1132.
96. A quotation from the lengthy opinion in Bracco v. Lackner poignantly describes the
quality and degree of unbridled discretion that Medicaid nursing home residents seek to
avoid. "What caused all this fear, havoc, injury and misery? Was it a war, flood, tidal wave,
earthquake or other terrifying Act of God? Not at all. It was the decision of a large State
bureaucracy, not unaided by a huge federal bureaucracy, requiring these helpless, elderly
patients to move out in a hurry. . . ." 462 F. Supp. at 445.
The dangerous degree of unbridled discretion that threatens elderly Medicaid residents
in the absence of an adequate relocation plan is likewise demonstrated by the situation
presented in Brede v. Director for Dep't of Health, 616 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1980). In Brede,
patients at Hale Mohalu, a Hawaii leprosarium, brought suit complaining of the closing of
the leprosarium. "A number of the facility's residents, in appreciation of the residential
nature of Hale Mohaiu with its private or semi-private living quarters and easy access to
friends and family, chose to remain . . . . mhe inpatient residents remaining at Hale
Mohalu were among the more elderly, afflicted, and crippled of the leprosy population. On
January 26, 1978, the Hale Mohalu facility was officially closed. In recognition of the con-
tinued residence of those patients who had decided to remain, the state provided water,
electrical power, telephone service, food, medical care, and supplies until September 1, 1978,
when all these services were terminated. On September 5, a number of those patients still at
Hale Mohalu filed. . . suit. . .. ." Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
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lief of Medicaid regulatory enforcement agencies that decertification
triggering transfer remains a viable method to enforce standards of care
does little to justify the devastating effects of transfer trauma on fragile,
elderly nursing home residents.97 The Constitution guarantees to all
individuals the right to be free from unwarranted state-imposed physi-
cal and psychological harm. How much longer will this fundamental
right be denied to those among us who find themselves in government
regulated nursing homes?
97. The beneficent purpose of decertification loses its vitality in light of the fact that
decertification is an ineffective enforcement mechanism. See notes 78, 79 and accompany-
ing text supra. This is particularly true when the purpose of decertification is weighed
against the dangers of relocation shock. "Experience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to free-
dom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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